ǂThe ǂproblem of personal identity and contemporary approaches to cognition

[M. Sokić]

123 str.

Filozofija - Filozofija ličnog identiteta, filozofija kognicije / Philosophy - Philosophy of Personal Identity, Philosophy of Cognition

nužnih i dovoljnih uslova na osnovu kojih je osoba x1 u trenutku t1 numerički identična osobi xn u nekom drugom (prošlom ili budućem) trenutku tn. Iako ovaj problem ima dugu istoriju u zapadnoj filozofiji, u disertaciji ću se usmeriti na savremeniji pristup ovom problemu. Analizu započinjem savremenim interpretacijama Lokovog (John Locke) kriterijuma, u okviru kojih se problem ličnog identiteta nastoji rešiti isključivim oslanjanjem na psihološke faktore. Tvrdiću da nijedan od psiholoških kriterijuma – ni samostalno ni u kombinaciji sa kasnije uvedenim telesnim kriterijumom i kriterijumom mozga – ne pruža nužne i dovoljne uslove za lični identitet. Potom ću detaljno razmotriti Parfitovo (Derek Parfit) gledište i animalistički kriterijum, kao jedan od sve uticajnijih pokušaja rešenja problema ličnog identiteta u savremenim filozofskim raspravama. U svetlu svih nedostataka i problema kriterijuma koji su predstavljeni u prvih pet poglavlja, u šestom poglavlju ću formulisati kriterijum koji kombinuje elemente animalizma i Parfitovog gledišta, ali ih dodatno opravdava oslanjajući se na savremene uvide iz filozofije kognicije. Prema ovom kombinovanom kriterijumu, mi smo identični određenim utelovljenim kognitivnim sistemima, pri čemu bar neki od tih sistema i njihovih procesa mogu biti i prošireni, dok su osobe shvaćene kao fazna (sortalna) svojstva ovih kognitivnih sistema, odnosno svojstva koja ti sistemi instanciraju u određenim vremenskim periodima. Glavni zadatak disertacije je da pokaže kako kombinovani kriterijum uspešno rešava problematične slučajeve, poput mogućnosti veštačkih osoba, slučajeva grananja, te da izbegava većinu teorijskih i praktičnih prigovora koji su upućivani prethodnim kriterijumima.

This dissertation examines the problem of diachronic personal identity, specifically the question of what necessary and sufficient conditions determine whether a person x₁ at time t₁ is numerically identical to a person xₙ at some other time tₙ, whether in the past or the future. Although this problem has a long history in Western philosophy, my focus here will be on contemporary approaches to it. I begin by analyzing Locke’s criterion as interpreted in modern discussions, where personal identity is often explained exclusively in terms of psychological factors. I will argue that no psychological criterion—whether considered independently or in conjunction with the later introduced bodily and brain criteria—provides necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity. I then turn to Parfit’s view and the animalist criterion, which has become one of the more influential contemporary attempts to resolve the problem of personal identity. In light of the difficulties and shortcomings of the criteria discussed in the first five chapters, in the sixth chapter, I will propose a combined criterion that integrates elements of animalism and Parfit’s view, while further justifying them by drawing on contemporary insights from the philosophy of cognition. According to this combined criterion, we are identical to certain embodied cognitive systems, some of which—along with certain cognitive processes—may be extended. At the same time, persons are best understood as phasal (sortal) properties of these cognitive systems, meaning that they are properties instantiated by such systems over specific periods of time. The primary objective of this dissertation is to show that the combined criterion successfully accounts for problematic cases—such as the possibility of artificial persons and branching scenarios—while also avoiding most of the theoretical and practical objections commonly raised against previous criteria

Lični identitet, osobe, perzistencija, psihološki kontinuitet, animalizam, funkcionalizam, kognicija, utelovljenje

Personal identity, persons, persistence, psychological continuity, animalism, functionalism, cognition, embodiment

159.923.2:1(043.3)

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